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CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GARRET:  
PROVIDING MEDICALLY RELATED SERVICES TO CHILDREN 
WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, eight million children suffered from disabilities in the United 
States.1  The majority of these children were insufficiently educated and more 
than one million were barred from the public school system entirely.2  
Currently, there are nearly 2.5 million children with disabilities that receive an 
inadequate education.3 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act4 
(IDEA), originally entitled the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
19755 (EAHCA), was created as Congress’s response to the lack of educational 
opportunities for children with disabilities.6  In its most recent IDEA case, 
Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret,7 the High Court continued 
to expand upon this Congressional goal by affirming the lower court’s decision 
to provide “related services” and a “free appropriate public education” to 
children with disabilities.8 
Prior to Garret, but within the past ten to fifteen years, burdens on school 
districts to provide the educational opportunity the IDEA requires have grown 
 
 1. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 
(1982)  (citing Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1970, 94 Pub. L. No. 142, 89 Stat. 
774 (1975)); see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1) (1994). 
 2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3)-(4) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. 
 3. Matthew J. Schaefer, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Related Services” 
Versus “Medical Services?”, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 143 (1999). 
 4. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994). 
 5. 94 Pub. L. No. 142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 6. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180. 
 7. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999). 
 8. Id. at 1000. 
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substantially.9  In response to state and local concerns, the pre-Garret courts 
delivered numerous decisions absolving school districts from furnishing full-
time health “related services” to students with disabilities.10  Those courts held 
that Congress did not intend the IDEA to impose unexpected financial and 
administrative burdens upon states.11 
The Garret Court addressed this issue and resolved that school districts are 
required to provide “related services” to special education students, as long as 
the services do not fall into the “medical services” exemption.12  The IDEA 
limits “medical services” to those services provided for diagnostic and 
evaluative purposes only.13  In Irving Independent School District v. Tatro,14 
the forerunner to the Garret decision, the Court restricted “medical services” 
even further by holding that health services provided by a physician are 
excluded from “related services.”15  However, services provided by a nurse or 
other non-physician health care professional are included as “related 
services.”16  Affirming and clarifying Tatro, the Supreme Court in Garret 
unreasonably held that a school district must supply a one-on-one nurse to 
provide extensive and intense health services to children with life-threatening 
conditions so children with disabilities can receive a public education.17 
This Note will first examine the foundation, rationale and relevant 
statutory regulations of the IDEA.  This section will also study the case history 
leading to the initiation of the IDEA.  Section two will review the case history 
prior to Garret and the problems raised by a “provider-based” rule.  It will 
distinguish “related services” from “medical services” and clarify why the 
extent and nature of the services must be considered.  This Note will evaluate 
Congress’s intent and the purpose of the IDEA regarding the responsibilities of 
school districts as reasonable, fair and not excessively burdensome.  In the 
third section, the Garret decision will be thoroughly assessed and critically 
analyzed. 
This Note concludes that the extent and nature of the services provided 
must be balanced with a reasonably anticipated financial and educational 
 
 9. See infra notes 123, 154-55 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Detsel v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987).  See Granite Sch. 
Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992).  See Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71 
(W.D. Pa. 1987).  See also Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett, 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999) 
(abrogating Neely and Detsel). 
 11. See infra notes 118, 123, 149, 153 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 
 13. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994). 
 14. 468 U.S. 883, 883 (1984) (holding that children with disabilities deserve a public 
education and “related services,” but not “medical services”). 
 15. Id. at 892. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra note 220 and accompanying text. 
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commitment of a school district to determine whether full-time nursing 
services are feasible.18  A bright line “provider-based” rule is inadequate and 
discounts the purpose of the IDEA to educate and attend to “medically fragile” 
students when appropriate.19 
HISTORY 
I. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
A. Origin of the IDEA and Congress’s Intent 
Congress first addressed the issue of educating children with disabilities in 
1966.20  It revised the “Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to 
establish a grant program ‘for the purpose of assisting the states in the 
initiation, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects . . . for the 
education of handicapped children.’”21  This program was repealed in 1970 
and replaced by the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).22  While both 
programs were implemented to encourage states to develop financial resources 
for education, neither Act proposed specific guidelines for the utilization of 
federal money.23 
In 1974, Congress granted large sums of federal money to the states to 
enroll and educate children with handicaps in the public school system.24  The 
following year Congress passed the EAHCA to establish state education 
programs supported by federal funds.25  Then, in 1991, Congress amended the 
EAHCA by substituting and codifying the registered name to the IDEA.26 
In order for a state to qualify for federal financial assistance under the 
IDEA, it must demonstrate that students with handicaps are afforded a “free 
appropriate public education.”27  States must also devise an educational policy 
in a state plan to be approved by the Secretary of Education.28  This policy 
must identify and detail the curriculum, services and objectives that will be 
 
 18. See infra notes 130 and 168 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 147, 154-55 and 158 and accompanying text. 
 20. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) 
(citing Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 89 Pub. L. No. 750, § 161, 80 Stat. 
1204 (1966)). 
 21. Id.; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179-80 (quoting 89 Pub. L. No. 750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204). 
 22. Education of the Handicapped Act, 91 Pub. L. No. 230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). 
 23. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180. 
 24. Id. (citing 93 Pub. L. 380, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974) (allowing Congress an interim of one 
year “to study what if any additional Federal assistance [was] required to enable the states to meet 
the needs of handicapped children”). 
 25. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180. 
 26. 102 Pub. L. No. 119, § 25(b). 
 27. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)  (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81. 
 28. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
234 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:231 
implemented and accomplished to improve special education.29  The policy 
must also give priority “first with respect to children with disabilities who are 
not receiving an education, and second with respect to children with 
disabilities, within each disability category, with the most severe disabilities 
who are receiving an inadequate education. . . .”30  Congress stated in the 
statute that it is in the national interest to provide financial resources to the 
states to ensure that local schools meet the educational needs of children with 
disabilities.31 
B. Landmark Cases for the Initiation of the IDEA and the Provision of 
“Related Services”: PARC and Mills 
In the early 1970’s, two district court cases served as milestones to 
Congress’s enactment of the IDEA.32  The first, Pennsylvania Ass’n. for 
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,33 determined that 
school-aged children with disabilities were entitled to free public education 
and training.34  The court adopted a consent agreement, written by the parties, 
obligating the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide access to education 
and training for children with mental and physical disabilities suitable to each 
child’s capacities.35  Under this consent agreement, school districts had to 
provide notice of the educational opportunity and plan to name, locate and 
evaluate all children with handicaps that were eligible for public education.36 
Further, the court required the Secretary of Education to assure that an 
Individualized Education Program (IEP) appropriate to each child’s capability 
was in place.37  The court also required that the Secretary be informed of the 
educational status of each child with mental handicaps.38  Because Congress’s 
intent was to integrate these students into the public school system, the court 
 
 29. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1413 (1994)). 
 30. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181. 
 31. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1994). 
 32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 n.2 (identifying Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866 
(D.C. 1972) and Pennsylvania Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter PARC] as the most prominent cases in the 
endorsement of the IDEA). 
 33. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 34. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 302 (enjoining the defendants from applying the Public School 
Code of 1949, 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1304, 1330(2), 13-1371(1) and 13-1375, to postpone, 
deny, or terminate the education or training of mentally handicapped students). 
 35. Id. at 306-07 (explaining in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the consent agreement that the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania assumed this responsibility); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192. 
 36. PARC, 343 F.Supp. at 314 (pursuing handicapped children by television and radio 
broadcasting, newspaper publishings, school records, and hospital or other related facilities 
listings). 
 37. Id. at 313. 
 38. Id. at 313-14. 
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declared homebound instruction to be the least favorable alternative to primary 
public education.39  Rather, the court opined that primary public education 
benefits a child with handicaps through efficient and thorough classroom 
instruction and social learning.  The court relied on expert testimony to 
conclude that people with mental handicaps are able to attain self-sufficiency 
and aptitude through proper training and instruction.40 
The second case, Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia,41 
held that children with handicaps could not be entirely excluded from publicly 
supported education.42  Mills required equity in funding for programs and a 
balance in importance of services for students with and without disabilities 
alike.43  The seven minor plaintiffs were alleged to have “behavioral 
problems,” mental retardation and physical abnormalities.44  These disabilities 
led to their expulsion or denial from public schools.45  The court enjoined the 
school district from eliminating these students and ordered that the students 
must be afforded due process and a hearing before a hearing officer prior to 
suspension, expulsion, denial or transfer from public education.46 
The court required the school to devise a plan detailing its efforts to 
develop educational assessments, courses, goals and additional services for 
these “exceptional” students.47  The court further determined that the Board of 
Education was responsible for providing the opportunity and facility for this 
 
 39. Id. at 313-14 (stating that home instruction shall only occur when it is not feasible to 
educate in the public or special schools and commands re-evaluation every three months to ensure 
that it is most appropriate to the child’s capacity). 
 40. Id. at 296 (stating that achieving self-care and social independence is highly probable).  
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 296 n.50 (citing DR. AUBREY J. YATES, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 234 (1970)). 
 41. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 42. Id. at 878 (stating that providing adequate educational alternatives, a prior hearing and 
periodic re-evaluation of the handicapped student, is essential in the absence of public education); 
see Kelly S. Thompson, Limits on the Ability to Discipline Disabled School Children: Do the 
1997 Amendments to the IDEA Go Far Enough, 32 IND. L. REV. 565, 567 (1999). 
 43. Mills v. Board of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.C. 1972) (stating that failing 
to retain these students due to lack of financial resources is inexcusable). 
 44. Id. at 869-70; see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 567. 
 45. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 869-70 (promising placement in the public school system, the 
school district again denied admittance and divested tuition grants for private special education). 
 46. Id. at 880-81 (recognizing that disciplinary actions are permitted up to two days without 
first notifying the student’s parent or guardian); see also Thompson, supra note 42, at 567 (stating 
that violating this regulation infringes upon constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due 
process). 
 47. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 879; Pennsylvania Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (defining “exceptional children” as 
“children of school age who deviate from the average in physical, mental, emotional or social 
characteristics to such an extent that they require special educational facilities or services . . . .”)  
(citing 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1371(1)). 
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teaching.48  Additionally, the Board of Education was compelled to coordinate 
educational, vocational and recreational activities for individual and civic 
purposes.49  In reaching these conclusions, the court relied on the Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education:50 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. . . .  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.  
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.51 
C. IDEA Statutory Principles, Policies and Definitions 
The IDEA targets children with disabilities who are between the ages of 
three and twenty-one.52 “Children with disabilities” includes children 
challenged with “orthopedic impairments . . . [and] other health 
impairments . . .; who, by reason thereof, need special education and related 
services.”53 Special education is characterized as “specially designed 
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a 
child with a disability . . . .”54 
The phrase “related services” is defined as: 
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive 
services (including . . . physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including 
therapeutic recreation, social work services, counseling services, including 
rehabilitation counseling, and medical services, except that such medical 
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be 
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and 
includes the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in 
children.55 
 
 48. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876 The Board is ultimately responsible for “maximiz[ing] 
coordination of educational and other municipal programs and services in achieving the most 
effective educational system and utilization of educational facilities.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 876-77 (using these services and resources to promote the prominence of the 
school in the community). 
 50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 51. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874-75 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)). 
 52. Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?, at 
http://www.granite.k12.ut.us/Special_Ed/p194142.html (last visited Oct. 3, 1999). 
 53. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994). 
 54. Id. at § 1401(a)(16), (a)(16)(A)-(B) (1994) (including classroom, homebound, hospital, 
institution, and physical education). 
 55. Id. at § 1401(a)(17) (1994); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a) (1998). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GARRET 237 
Within the “related services” provision is the “medical services” exemption.56  
The term “medical services” means “services provided by a licensed physician 
to determine a child’s medically related disability that results in the child’s 
need for special education and related services.”57  Importantly, “medical 
services” only include those services that are provided by a licensed physician, 
not services provided by a nurse or other professional health care provider.58 
In addition, the term “school health services” refers to “services provided 
by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person.”59  A student with a 
disability will qualify for a “free appropriate public education” if the provided 
services are “school health services” or “related services,” but not when the 
services are “medical services.”60 
The expression “free appropriate public education” means “special 
education and related services that A) have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, . . . and D) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program . . . .”61  The term “free” 
means that the education is provided without cost to the family.62  While the 
term “appropriate” may include an out-of-district school or a private 
institution, “appropriate” does not necessarily mean the “best” education.63  
The student’s “appropriate” educational needs are set forth in the IEP.64 
An IEP is a written legal document that is specifically formulated to 
describe the curriculum and special services of each child with a disability.65  
An IEP is developed by a parent or guardian and a teacher, while one in an 
administrative position supervises the execution of the plan.66  Congress 
requires that each IEP include: 
A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, 
B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, 
 
 56. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994). 
 57. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16; see also infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 58. See also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
 59. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) (1998); see also infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 60. See also infra notes 219, 222-23, 240 and 242 and accompanying text. 
 61. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(A)-(D) (1994). 
 62. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20) (1994); see also Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?, supra note 52 (pledging to reach the educational 
needs, goals, and services the child requires). 
 66. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20); see also Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, What is IDEA?, supra note 52 (identifying the student and other people involved 
in the child’s education when appropriate). 
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C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such 
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in 
regular educational programs, 
D) a statement of the needed transition services67 . . ., 
E) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, 
and 
F) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for 
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives 
are being achieved.68 
When a parent or guardian is dissatisfied with the IEP, he or she is entitled 
to examine the records to inspect the child’s educational development69 and 
can obtain an evaluation of the student’s academic performance.70  If the IEP is 
unsatisfactory, then a complaint may be filed with a state, local, or 
intermediate educational agency.71  Pending the decision of a local or 
intermediate hearing, a party may appeal to the state agency.72 
An action to modify the IEP can be made after the administrative remedies 
provided by the IDEA have been exhausted.73  The purpose of exhausting the 
administrative remedies is to allow the school district to utilize its educational 
proficiency to develop a special education curriculum and to compose a factual 
record.74  An aggrieved party, who is denied the right to an appeal or who is 
still frustrated by the state agency decision, may bring a civil action in the 
federal district court or a state court of competent jurisdiction.75 
D. Purpose of the IDEA 
The IDEA resolves to establish a “free appropriate public education” 
program for students with disabilities on an individualized basis in the least 
 
 67. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1994) (stating that transition services incorporate post-
secondary education, vocational training, and independent living preparation, based on the 
individual student’s needs). 
 68. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(A)-(F) (1994). 
 69. Id. at § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1994). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at § 1415(i)(E). 
 72. Id. at § 1415(c). 
 73. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. South Lyon Cmty. Sch., 602 N.W.2d 588, 592-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1999) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415). 
 74. Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 696 (Ely), 951 F. Supp. 867, 888 (D. Minn. 1996) 
(allowing the school district the opportunity to correct the educational program of the current 
IEP). 
 75. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(2) (1994) (stating that filing a complaint in the federal court is 
permitted, regardless of the amount in controversy). 
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restrictive environment.76  It obligates a school district to sustain and evaluate 
the effort and success of such education.77  The statute says that children with 
handicaps will receive “a free appropriate public education that emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs . . . .”78  Although “related services” are required by the IDEA, the 
statute does not expressly state that a school district must provide a one-on-one 
nurse or full-time individualized nursing services to children with disabilities.79 
Each participating state must devise a plan to provide children with 
disabilities a full educational opportunity and “related services.”80  States must 
draft a comprehensive schedule for achieving this plan and explain the type 
and quantity of facilities, personnel and services that are needed throughout the 
State to accomplish the goals set therein.81  Additionally, in order to effectuate 
the “free appropriate public education,” the IDEA requires that students “in 
need of special education and related services [be] identified, located, and 
evaluated.”82 
Another purpose of the IDEA is to educate children with disabilities along 
with children without disabilities “to the maximum extent appropriate.”83  The 
IDEA, however, does not obligate public schools to “mainstream” children 
with disabilities or to maximize each child’s learning potential.84  Despite the 
“mainstreaming” preference, “the nature or severity of the disability [may be] 
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily . . . .”85  The ability to learn and 
retain information differs for each student, and providing equal educational 
opportunities to children with disabilities is an “entirely unworkable standard 
requiring impossible measurements and comparisons.”86 
 
 76. Public Law 94-142: The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, What is IDEA?, 
supra note 52 (summarizing the basic tenants of the IDEA). 
 77. Id. 
 78. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 79. Id. at § 1401(22). 
 80. Id. at § 1412(a)(1)-(2). 
 81. Id. at § 1412(2)(A)(i)-(iii). 
 82. Id. at § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
 83. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 
(1982), 198-99. 
 84. Id. at 189 (stating that “[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is any 
substantive standard prescribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children”). 
 85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1994); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n.4. 
 86. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198 (noting that “furnishing handicapped children with only such 
services as are available to nonhandicapped [sic] children would in all probability fall short of the 
statutory requirement of ‘free appropriate public education’; to require, on the other hand, the 
furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child’s potential is, 
we think, further than Congress intended to go”). 
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA 
A. Bright Line Physician/non-physician Test for “Related Services” 
In Tatro, an eight-year old girl suffered from spina bifida,87 which 
impaired her speech and voluntary secretion of urine.88  She required clean 
intermittent catherization89 (CIC) from a school nurse, or other qualified 
individual, as a “supportive service” to stay in school.90  The Tatro Court 
applied the statutory definition of “related services” to determine whether CIC 
is within the scope of the IDEA.91  Because CIC is not specifically listed in the 
“related services” provision of the IDEA, the Court established a two-step test 
to aid it in its decision.92 
First, the Court declared that it must decide if CIC was a “‘supportive 
servic[e] . . . required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special 
education’; and second, whether CIC is excluded from this definition as a 
‘medical servic[e].’”93  If the CIC services did not meet the “related services” 
definition, or did meet the “related services” definition, but qualified as a 
“medical services” exemption, then the school district was relieved of the 
responsibility to provide a “free appropriate public education.”94  In order to 
minimize the burden of the school district from providing an array of health 
services, the Court noted several statutory limitations.95  A school district was 
only obligated to provide “related services” if: 1) the child had disabilities and 
required special education, 2) the services were essential to the student’s 
success in special education, and 3) the services were not performed by a 
licensed physician.96 
 
 87. Spina Bifida, at http://members.tripod.com/~imaware/sb.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
1999).  Spina Bifida is a physical disability caused by a prenatal malformation of the spine in 
which the spinal column does not fasten together.  Id. 
 88. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885. 
 89. Id.; Cincinatti Children’s Hospital Medical Center, Intermittent Catherization – Males 
(Clean Technique), at  http://www.chmcc.org/family/pep/pep2031.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).  
CIC is a mechanism used to excrete urine from the bladder via a catheter.  Id.  CIC is a simple 
service requiring little training and can be performed in just a few minutes.  Tatro, 468 U.S. at 
885. 
 90. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890-91, aff’g Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 91. Id. at 890. 
 92. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (Supp. IV 1998); Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890. 
 93. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890. 
 94. See id. at 895. 
 95. Id. at 894. 
 96. Id. at 894.  “In the absence of a handicap that requires special education, the need for 
what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an obligation under the Act.”  Id. 
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The Supreme Court found CIC to be a “related service” and that it fit the 
definition of a “school health service.”97 As a supportive service, CIC 
benefited the plaintiff and allowed her to attend public school and receive an 
appropriate education.98  Because a licensed physician did not deliver CIC and 
the services were not beyond diagnostic or evaluative purposes, the Court did 
not regard CIC as falling under the “medical services” exclusion.99  In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court relied on the statutory interpretation by the Secretary 
of Education that “medical services” provided by a physician or hospital are 
excludable, but not when the services are provided by a school nurse.100  Thus, 
the Court did not consider CIC to be extrinsically burdensome.  The Court 
stated that the Secretary’s determination was reasonable even though the Court 
recognized that Congress spent practically no time or effort explaining the 
“medical services” exemption.101 
Providing CIC at school tendered the plaintiff with “meaningful access” to 
public education and was no more demanding “than are services that enable 
the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.”102  Congress’ desire when enacting 
the IDEA was to provide students with disabilities access to public 
education.103  The IDEA does not require that school districts guarantee a 
particular level of learning or that the provision of “related services” will 
maximize a student’s learning potential.104 
Although the defendant in Tatro contested that CIC fell under the “medical 
services” exclusion regardless of the provider, the Tatro Court said that this 
exclusion was only intended to excuse school districts from excessively 
expensive and onerous services, such as those provided by a physician.105  The 
Court evaluated services that are administered by a nurse to students without 
disabilities, but prescribed by a physician, as indicative and inclusive of the 
services to be provided to students with disabilities as well.106  Thus, the Court 
said that CIC was not unlike or easily distinguishable from those services that 
are routinely provided to students without disabilities.107 
 
 97. Id. at 892 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1983), revised by 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(11) 
(1998)). 
 98. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 890. 
 99. Id. at 892, 895. 
 100. Id. at 892-93. 
 101. Id. at 892. 
 102. Id. at 891. 
 103. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Schl. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 191 
(1982). 
 104. Id. at 200. 
 105. Tatro, 469 U.S. at 892 (specifying that children with extreme medical conditions are 
entitled to special education through homebound or hospital instruction). 
 106. Id. at 893-94 (extending special services to non-handicapped students, such as 
emergency injections, is analogous to the provision of CIC for handicapped students). 
 107. Id. at 893-94. 
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School nurses are an integral element of the educational system; it is 
reasonable to infer that Congress did not intend the “medical services” 
exclusion to apply to the services nurses provide.108  In contrast, the services 
provided by a physician or hospital are significantly more expensive and may 
be beyond the competence of a school nurse.109  As a result, the Tatro Court 
created a bright-line “provider-based” rule; those services that are provided by 
a physician, other than for diagnosis and evaluation, are excluded from “related 
services” as a “medical services” exemption.110 
B. The Expansion of the Tatro Rule 
1. Full-Time Nursing Services are not “Related Services”:  They Create 
an Undue Burden and Financial Encumbrance on a School District 
Courts have rejected Tatro’s “physician-based” rule as determinative of 
whether health-care services qualify as related or medical services.111  
Congressional intent was interpreted more broadly and a reasonableness 
standard was initiated to replace the “physician-based” rule.  These cases 
stressed the importance of fairness and practicality when balancing the 
inherent burdens on the school district with the uncertain benefits to the 
student.112 
Since Tatro, numerous cases involving more extensive and intense health 
related services have come before the lower courts.  In Bevin v. Wright,113 the 
seven-year old plaintiff suffered from severe mental retardation, seizures, 
blindness and extreme difficulty in breathing.114  Because of these disabilities, 
it was necessary for a nurse to regularly suction Bevin’s tracheostomy tube, 
provide a constant source of oxygen and stay with Bevin throughout the day to 
prevent injury.115  In contrast to students who required intermittent treatment, 
 
 108. Id. at 893 (nursing services are not a significant burden on a school district). 
 109. Id.  The court noted that medical services performed by a licensed physician “serve other 
purposes.”  Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892 n.10. 
 110. Id. at 891-95; Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 825 
(8th Cir. 1997). 
 111. See, e.g., Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. California Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 
635, 643 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 112. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 113. 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
 114. Id. at 72.  Bronchopulmonary dysplasia is a chronic lung disease incident to infants with 
lung infection or resulting from mechanical respiration because of premature birth.  
Brochopulmonary Dysplasia, at http://www2.medsch.wisc.edu/childrenhosp/parents_of_ 
preemies/bpd.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  Common symptoms include wheezing, rapid 
breathing and slowed growth.  Id. 
 115. Bevin, 666 F.Supp. at 73.  In order to prevent serious injury to Bevin in case a mucous 
plug blocks her tracheostomy tube, she must get immediate nursing attention within thirty 
seconds.  Id. 
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like the plaintiff in Tatro, Bevin needed constant care and attention as the 
“private duty” of a health care provider.116  The plaintiff contended that the 
type of health-care provider was conclusive and that the extent and nature of 
the services provided was irrelevant.117 
The court found that the chronic health services Bevin required were 
expensive, comprehensive and time-consuming.118  Bevin’s services did not 
comport with the exact terms of the “medical services” definition, nor did they 
qualify as simple school health services.119  Even though a physician did not 
provide these services, their exclusion corresponded with the general spirit of 
the IDEA.120 
The court recognized that states receive the benefit of federal money and 
may be required to provide special services or acquire additional personnel.121  
The plaintiffs argued that “[t]he determination of what is a medical service and 
therefore not the obligation of the school district is based solely on the status of 
the health care provider. The nature and extent of the services are 
irrelevant.”122  However, the court held that school districts were not required 
to provide extensive nursing services that are so intensive and costly that they 
more closely resemble the excluded “medical services” than the included 
“related services.”123 
The Bevin court relied on the Third Circuit case, Tokarcik v. Forest Hills 
School District,124 for the proposition that time and money are significant 
criterion to be considered in the determination of whether services are 
includable “related services” or excludable “medical services.”125  The Bevin 
court noted that Tokarcik did not restrict its analysis to the professional status 
of the health care provider.126  The Bevin court followed this line of reasoning 
to determine that the nursing services Bevin required were outside the spirit of 
the IDEA.127  The court concluded that full-time nursing services are beyond 
 
 116. Id. at 75.  “Because of this need for constant vigilance, a school nurse or any other 
qualified person with responsibility for other children within the school could not safely care for 
Bevin.”  Id. 
 117. Id. at 74. 
 118. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 74-5.  Life-threatening prospect is far beyond the burden the court 
will delegate to the school district, however, it is not the intent of the court that only inexpensive, 
simple services be provided.  Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 76. 
 122. Id. at 74. 
 123. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 76. 
 124. 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1981). 
 125. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 75 (citing Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 663 F.2d 443, 456 
(3rd Cir. 1981)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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the “related services” provision and are more in the nature of “medical 
services.”128 
The Bevin court referred to Tokarcik to emphasize that “related services” 
include what is required within reason to make an educational setting suitable 
for a child with disabilities to benefit from it.129  A standard of reasonableness 
and fair balance in assessing the adequacy of the services and the educational 
environment is the more proper criteria.130  Thus, Bevin’s required services 
were representative of the intended “medical services” exclusion enumerated 
in the IDEA, as opposed to the incorporated “related services” which the IDEA 
imposes upon school districts.131 
In a similar case, the court in Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon132 denied 
Shannon’s motion to affirm the judgment of the State Review Panel and 
granted Granite’s motion for summary judgment.133  Shannon, a kindergarten 
student, suffered from congenital neuromuscular disorder134 and severe 
scoliosis,135 and was thus confined to a motorized wheelchair.136 
Shannon also endured tracheostomy suctioning, feeding through a 
nasogastric tube137 and manually assisted respiration when her inhalation of 
oxygen was restricted.138  Shannon requested full-time nursing care as a 
“related service” under the IDEA as part of her “free appropriate public 
 
 128. Id. at 75-6. 
 129. Id. at 75.  “The Court proceeded not by ascertaining the status of the health care provider 
as plaintiffs urge here, but on a careful review of the nature and extent of the services required by 
the child and their impact on the school district.”  Id. (referring to Department of Educ. v. 
Katherine, 727 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 130. Bevin, 666 F. Supp. at 75 (examining the cost, treatment, time involved, existing school 
health care providers, and the reasonableness of the requested services is more acceptable than 
limiting the inquiry to the professional capacity of the provider). 
 131. Id. at 76. 
 132. 787 F. Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992). 
 133. Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1021, 1030. 
 134. Compton’s Encyclopedia Online, Neuromuscular Disease (Visited Oct. 25, 1999) 
<http://www.optonline.com/comptons/ceo/26754_Q.html>. Neuromuscular disorders can 
transpire from damage to the spinal cord and can weaken muscles to the point of inability or 
atrophy.  Id. 
 135. KidsHealth.org, Straighten Up! Scoliosis Can Be Treated, at http://kidshealth.org/kid/ 
normal/scolio.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999); What is Scoliosis, at http://www.medhelp.org/lib. 
scolio.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  Scoliosis is an abnormal “S-shaped” curve in the spine 
which may cause body disfigurement, asymmetry, back pain, or correlate to heart failure.  Id. 
 136. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1022. 
 137. While You Are Waiting, ICU Equipment: Nasogastric Tube, at http://www.waiting.com/ 
nasogastric.html (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  A nasogastric tube is a clear plastic tube inserted 
through the nose, down the esophagus, and into the stomach and is used for feeding or cleansing.  
Id. 
 138. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1022.  Occasioning a heart attack, Shannon is not to be given 
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR).  Id. 
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education.”139  The court distinguished Shannon’s care from the care delivered 
in Tatro by focusing on the continuous duty of a school nurse to provide 
immediate and life-preserving treatment.140 
Additionally, the court found that the extensive nursing services Shannon 
required fell within the “medical services” exclusion of the IDEA.141  The 
court expressly stated that the Tatro “physician-based” rule was a “narrow 
construction of the medical services exclusion of the Act.”142  The court 
stressed the significance of the differences in the levels of care required in 
Tatro to the more extensive services required in the present case.143  The court 
concluded that Granite was not required to provide Shannon with full-time 
nursing care as a supportive or related service under the IDEA.144 
Further, the court found that Shannon received an educational benefit from 
her homebound instruction.145  Though recognizing that Shannon would 
receive more benefits from attending a public school with constant vigilance, 
the Granite court concluded that the IDEA does not require schools to provide 
every educational opportunity to completely dependent students suffering from 
multiple or severe disabilities.146  Rather, the IDEA allows students to be 
removed from the classroom when supplementary aids and services are 
inadequate to facilitate satisfactory learning.147  The court was of the opinion 
that “mainstreaming” or educating Shannon with other students without 
disabilities could not be achieved satisfactorily.148  Shannon’s IEP bestowed 
sufficient services to present her with educational opportunity and benefits at 
home without burdening the school functionally or financially.149 
In Detsel v. Bd. of Educ. of the Auburn Enlarged City Sch. Dist.,150 the 
plaintiff, a seven-year old elementary school girl, required respirator support, a 
 
 139. Id. at 1022-23. 
 140. Id. at 1029-30.  “The harsh reality of Shannon’s case is that she requires the full-time 
care of at least a licensed practical nurse because of the constant possibility of a mucous plug in 
her tracheostomy tube . . . .  Without the appropriate care, Shannon’s disability becomes life 
threatening.”  Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1030. 
 143. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1030. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1028-29. 
 146. Id. at 1023, 1025, 1029 (relying on Thomas v. Cincinatti Bd. Of Educ., 918 F.2d 618 
(6th Cir. 1990)) (reasoning that the court was not deciding if placement in public education would 
be more advantageous, but that the revised IEP provided an education benefit and that the school 
district satisfied the IDEA substantive provisions). 
 147. Id. at 1023 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (Supp. IV 1998)).  See also supra note 87 
and accompanying text. 
 148. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1030. 
 149. Id. at 1029 (costing Granite about $30,000 a year to provide Shannon constant nursing 
care and detracting from other school programs). 
 150. 820 F.2d 587 (2nd Cir. 1987), aff’g 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. N.Y. 1986). 
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continuous supply of oxygen and constant therapeutic attention.151  The 
plaintiff emphasized the status and degree of the person performing the duty 
and attempted to minimize the extent to which the services were provided.152  
The district court recited the statement of the Secretary of Education in Tatro, 
emphasizing that section 1401(a)(17) of the IDEA was “intended to spare 
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly 
expensive and beyond the range of [a nurse’s] competence.”153  Furthermore, 
the court invoked the principle from Tatro that not all health services are 
required, regardless of their magnitude, if performed by another health-care 
professional as opposed to a physician.154 
The extreme nursing services in the instant case imposed a significant 
burden on the defendant and the IDEA does not mandate a school district to 
provide constant, expensive and intense in-school health care.155  Like Bevin, 
the services in Detsel did not conform to the terms of the “medical services” 
exclusion, nor were they simple examinations.156  Although the services Detsel 
required did not meet the physician requisite, the burdensome full-time nursing 
services were deemed to be outside the “related services” provision of the 
IDEA and more akin to the “medical services” exclusion.157  As seen from this 
interpretation, Tatro’s narrow evaluation of a provider-based analysis, “as the 
sole criterion for determining when services fall under the medical exclusion 
from liability,” is inadequate.158 
In another case, Neely v. Rutherford County Sch.,159 the court reversed the 
district court decision and held that certain requested services fell within the 
“medical services” exception of the “related services” component of the 
IDEA.160 Neely, a seven-year-old child who suffered from breathing 
complications,161 demanded extensive attention and instant availability in case 
 
 151. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1023. 
 152. Id. at 1026. 
 153. Id.; see also supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 154. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1027. 
 155. Id. at 1027 (noting that “[s]imple school nursing services do not similarly burden the 
schools . . . [and] the Tatro decision does not require the provision of all health services, 
regardless of their magnitude, if provided by one other than a physician”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. at 1026. 
 159. 68 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 160. Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 972 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 161. Congenital Central Hypoventilation Syndrome, Congenital Central Hypoventilation 
Syndrome: Central Hypoventilation Syndrome: Ondine’s, at http://www.cafamily.org.uk/ 
Direct/c60.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).  Central Hypoventilation Syndrome is a condition 
where a child cannot adequately breathe for him or herself and requires support from a ventilator 
attached to a tracheostomy.  Id. 
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of an emergency situation.162  Additionally, she required a tracheostomy tube 
inserted into her stoma163 to aid her breathing, as well as regular suctioning of 
her mouth, nose and throat to clear mucous blockage.164  The tracheostomy 
tube could easily be dislodged and Neely could lose consciousness or even die 
if respiration was not restarted promptly.165  Because Neely could not dispense 
her own tracheostomy care, she required a competent and well-trained health 
provider to administer the appropriate services.166 
The court determined that such services were “medical in nature,” and 
interpreted the Tatro decision to alleviate the obligation of providing every 
such service.167  Hiring a school nurse to provide extensive medical services 
specifically for Neely distinguished the instant case from Tatro.168  Rejecting 
the traditional “provider-based” interpretation from Tatro, the Neely court 
expanded the analysis of the care involved to include the extent and nature of 
the services provided, regardless of the title or income of the actual provider.169  
The court also notably considered the inherent risk and liability of the school 
district in providing such controversial services.170  Granting deference to the 
Bevin decision, the court in Neely agreed that it was the “private duty” 
component of Neely’s necessary health care that made the services intrinsically 
burdensome, and therefore within the “medical services” exemption of “related 
services.”171 
2. In Accordance with Tatro: “Related Services” Include Full-Time 
Nursing Services 
In Morton Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M.,172 the court affirmed 
a district court holding that J.M. was entitled to a full-time nurse as a “related 
 
 162. Neely, 68 F.3d at 967. 
 163. MedicineNet.com, Smart Medicine, at http://www.medicinenet.com/Script/Main/Art.asp 
?li=MNI&d=28&ArticleKey=5559 (last visited Aug. 2, 2000).  A stoma is “[a]n opening into the 
body from the outside created by a surgeon.”  Id. 
 164. Neely, 68 F.3d at 967.  Suctioning is done using a mechanical device and secretion 
obstruction varies with the seasons and her health.  Id. 
 165. Id.  Coughing or simple clothing adjustments can dislodge the tracheostomy tube. 
 166. Id.  Training must be sufficient to prevent panic in emergency situations and provide 
care with little margin of error. 
 167. Id. at 971 (resolving that Tatro does not require school districts “to provide every service 
which is medical in nature”). 
 168. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971. 
 169. Id. at 970-71 (allowing such practice so long as the person possesses the requisite 
licensing and training); see also Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(noting that the “restrictions imposed by Congress in section 1401(17) were intended to limit the 
nature of the services required rather than the personnel who may provide the service”). 
 170. Neely, 68 F.3d at 971. 
 171. Id. at 972-73; see also supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 172. 152 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1140 (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
248 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:231 
service” of his special education program.173  J.M. was regarded as “medically 
fragile” and required invariable attention by an attendant to aid and observe his 
respiration, lung and throat congestion and mobility.174  The court grappled 
with distinguishing the definition of “medical services” as difficult to 
distinguish between “related services of a medical nature that are covered by 
the IDEA and medical services that are not covered.”175 
The court concluded that “[c]atherization is obviously a medical service, so 
after Tatro we know that the term ‘medical services’ in the statute and 
regulation is not to be read literally.”176  Further, the court acknowledged that 
restricting the “medical services” definition to only those services provided by 
a physician would be illogical and unreasonable.177  Finally, the court reasoned 
that while the IDEA does not expressly elicit an undue burden defense, one 
may imply such a defense from “the statutory concepts of an ‘appropriate’ 
education and ‘related’ services.”178 After this discussion, however, the 
appellate court retreated to the judicial findings and judgment of the district 
court, and merely recognized the indistinct line separating supplementary 
educational services from medical interventions.179 
CEDAR RAPIDS COMMUNITY SCH. DIST. V. GARRET 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In 1987, at the age of four, Garret’s spinal column was severed in a tragic 
motorcycle accident leaving him paralyzed and ventilator dependant.180  As a 
result of the accident, Garret required numerous procedures to tolerate his 
debilitating condition, including: 
urinary bladder catheterization about once a day, suctioning of his 
tracheostomy181 as needed, food and drink on a regular schedule, 
 
 173. Morton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998); Allan 
G. Osborne, Jr., Comment, Supreme Court Rules That Schools Must Provide Full-Time Nursing 
Services for Medically Fragile Students, 136 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1999). 
 174. J.M., 152 F.3d at 587. 
 175. Id. at 587. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. J.M., 152 F.3d at 586. 
 179. Id. at 587-88. 
 180. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 119 S.Ct. 992, 995 (1999). 
 181. AARON’S TRACHEOSTOMY PAGE, What is Tracheostomy, at http://www.twinenter 
prises.com/trach/what.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  Tracheostomy is an opening into the 
windpipe in the throat, called a stoma.  Id.  Breathing is accomplished through a tube inserted into 
the stoma.  Id.; Aaron’s Tracheostomy Page, Suctioning a Tracheostomy, at 
http://www.twinendterprises.com/trach/suction.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  Suctioning of the 
tracheostomy is done to remove mucus to make breathing easier.  Id. 
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repositioning, ambu bag182 administration183 if the ventilator malfunctions, 
ventilator setting checks, observation for respiratory distress184 or autonomic 
hyperreflexia, 185 blood pressure monitoring and bowel [disimpaction]186 in 
cases of autonomic hyperreflexia.187 
For individuals suffering from severe spinal cord injuries like Garret, 
excessive activity of the autonomic nervous system,188 such as an overfull 
bladder, could suddenly lead to autonomic hyperreflexia.189  In these 
emergency situations, the lack of nerve impulses to the brain could cause the 
blood pressure to rise uncontrollably and result in spasm, stroke and possibly 
even death.190 
In addition, Garret is entirely dependent on his ventilator, which 
electrically sustains his breathing.191  In the event of a malfunction or 
maintenance situation, manual pumping of an air bag attached to the ventilator 
is essential.192  This process is known as ambu-bagging.193  Fortunately, Garret 
 
 182. Medspeak-The ER Dictionary, at http://www.knfpub.com/axe/er/medical.html#b (last 
visited July 23, 2000).  An ambu bag is a “handheld squeeze bag attached to a face mask.”  Id. 
 183. Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1995).  Controlled by 
manual operation, “an ambu bag is a device that artificially pumps air into the lungs.”  Id. 
 184. Aaron’s Tracheostomy Page, Tracheostomy Complications:  Symptoms of Respiratory 
Distress, at http:www.twinenterprises.com/trach/complica.htm (visited Oct. 25, 1999).  
Respiratory distress indicates difficulty in breathing and can also signify an increased heart rate or 
respiration rate.  Id. 
 185. RehabTeamSite, Other Complications of Spinal Cord Injury: Automatic Dysreflexia 
(Hyperreflexia), at http://calder.med.miami.edu/pointis/automatic.html (last visited Sept. 27, 
1999).  Autonomic dysreflexia (hyperreflexia) occurs when an irritating stimuli is introduced to 
the body below the level of the spinal cord injury.  Id.  Nerve impulses are blocked at the site of 
the spinal cord injury and this causes increased activity of the sympathetic portion of the 
autonomic nervous system.  Id.  The blood pressure begins to rise and the brain receives impulses 
from nerve receptors in the heart.  Id.  The heartbeat slows down, but the blood pressure cannot 
be controlled due to the lesion in the spinal cord.  Id.  Spinal cord injuries that are most 
susceptible to autonomic hyperrflexia are those which occur at a Thoracic 5 level or above.  Id. 
 186. Medspeak, at http://www.knfpub.com/axe/er/medical.html#b (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).  
Bowel disimpaction is the “manual removal of impacted fecal matter from a patient’s rectum.”  
Id. 
 187. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 1997); see 
also Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.3. 
 188. Femmer—The Autonomic Nervous System: The Autonomic Nervous System, at 
http://deu.cctt.org/content/Femmer/Brian/AutonomicNervousSystem/AutonomicNervousSystem.
htm (last visited Oct. 25, 1999).  The Autonomic Nervous System regulates involuntary muscles 
and involuntary body processes through the complementary sympathetic and parasympathetic 
nervous systems.  Id. 
 189. RehabTeamSite, Other Complications of Spinal Cord Injury: Automatic Dysreflexia 
(Hyperreflexia), supra note 185. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.2 (citing the A.L.J., App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a). 
 192. Id. 
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has not recurrently experienced autonomic hyperreflexia or a lack of oxygen in 
the past few years.194 
Garret operates a motorized wheelchair through “a puff and suck straw,” 
communicates orally and is mentally unaffected by his condition.195  Although 
he is successful academically, he requires a personal attendant to care for his 
continuous health care needs throughout the school day.196  In the fall of 1988, 
Garret began kindergarten and his aunt served as his attendant.197  For the next 
four years, Garret’s family employed a licensed practical nurse to provide one-
on-one care and continuous supervision while Garret was in school.198  When 
Garret reached the fifth grade, his mother requested that the Cedar Rapids 
Community School District (District) accept financial responsibility for 
Garret’s vital health care services.199  The District refused, denying that it had 
the responsibility to provide such intense and extensive services.200 
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY THAT LED GARRET TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Subsequent to a hearing before the Iowa Department of Education, an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that under the IDEA, the District was 
financially responsible for all of the services Garret required.201  The ALJ 
relied upon 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4) and (b)(11) to distinguish “‘school 
health services,’ which are provided by a ‘qualified school nurse or other 
qualified person,’ and ‘medical services,’ which are provided by a licensed 
physician.”202  This distinction, according to the ALJ, was not determined by “ 
‘the title of the person providing the service,’ but instead, the ‘medical 
services’ exclusion was limited to services that are ‘in the special training, 
knowledge, and judgment of a physician to carry out.’”203 
The District appealed this decision to the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Iowa.204  That court supported the ALJ’s decision and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Garret.205  Dissatisfied with this 
 
 193. Medspeak, supra note 186.  “Bagging” is defined as the “manual respiration for a patient 
having breathing trouble that uses a handheld squeeze bag attached to a face mask.”  Id. 
 194. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 995 n.3, (citing the A.L.J., App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a) (discussing 
the services Garret requires throughout the day). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 995-96. 
 199. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 996. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (quoting 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4), (b)(11)); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994). 
 203. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 996 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 51(a)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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decision, the District appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.206  
Following the Supreme Court holding in Tatro, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Garret.207 
The Court of Appeals utilized Tatro’s two-step test to first determine if the 
services Garret required were defined as “supportive services,” and second, 
whether such services went beyond the “medical services” exception of 
diagnosis and evaluation by a physician.208  Hence, the court followed Tatro’s 
bright line “physician-based” rule: “the services of a physician (other than for 
diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the ‘medical services’ 
exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a nurse or 
qualified layperson are not.”209 
In its analysis, the court reasoned that without the aforementioned health 
services, Garret would not be able to attend school or benefit from special 
education.210  In sum, the court held that Garret’s services qualified as “school 
health services” or “related services” because a physician did not provide 
them.211  The court stated that without these services Garret would be denied 
the very purpose for which the IDEA was enacted: to provide students with 
disabilities the opportunity for an appropriate level of special education in the 
public school system.212 
Unlike the ALJ, the court focused on the title of the provider, rather than 
the training, credence and comprehension involved in providing the services.213  
The court made it clear that it would not interpret the dicta of Tatro beyond the 
physician/non-physician test as several other circuits had already done.214  
Although the court gave some indication that it may not have agreed with 
Tatro, it acknowledged that it was bound by the decision of the Supreme 
Court.215 
III. THE DECISION OF THE GARRET MAJORITY 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Garret to resolve the divergence 
in the lower courts concerning the appropriate test to determine if health care 
services qualify as “related services” or “medical services.”216  In essence, the 
Court stressed that the proper analysis is not the nature and extent of the 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 106 F.3d 822, 824-25 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 825. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 119 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1999). 
 213. Garret, 106 F.3d at 825. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997. 
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services at hand.217  The seven-to-two decision reaffirmed Tatro and explicitly 
declared that the essential distinction is between the provider of “related 
services” and “medical services,” not the degree to which these services are 
provided.218  The Court held that medical services, however, cannot be 
provided by a physician beyond diagnostic and evaluative purposes.219  In sum, 
the Court affirmed summary judgment for Garret and ascertained that health 
related services must be made available by a school district, even if it demands 
extensive and continuous care.220 
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, emphasized that the 
intent of Congress and the purpose of the IDEA is to provide students with 
disabilities the opportunity for meaningful access to a “free appropriate public 
education.”221  In relying on its holding in Tatro, the Court reiterated “that the 
Secretary of Education had reasonably determined that the term ‘medical 
services’ referred only to services that must be performed by a physician [or 
hospital], and not to school health services.”222  While the Court stressed that a 
school nurse or other qualified individual provides “related services,” the 
IDEA was held to make no such distinction.223 
In Tatro, CIC was provided sporadically at school and was deemed a 
“related service” within the scope of the IDEA.224  In the instant case, the 
Court mistakenly determined that the periodic CIC in Tatro was no more 
“medical” than the non-stop, life-preserving services required by Garret.225  
Therefore, the majority incorrectly decided that Garret’s needs were “related 
services” that the District must provide.226  According to the Court, however, 
the term “medical services” does not encompass every form of health care that 
may be described as “medical in other contexts.”227 
 
 217. Id. (emphasis added). 
 218. Id. at 997-98, 998 n.7 (relying on the Secretary’s authority under the IDEA to take into 
account the nature and extent of the services, both of which were excluded from 20 U.S.C. § 
1401(22) (1994)) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae); see also Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). 
 219. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997-98, 998 n.6 (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1998) 
defining “medical services;” the determination of the Secretary that services provided by a nurse 
qualify as “related services,” but if similar services are provided by a physician they are 
excludable as “medical services”). 
 220. Id. at 1000. 
 221. Id. (quoting Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) and Board of 
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)). 
 222. Id. at 997-98. 
 223. Id. at 995 n.1; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1994). 
 224. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 997; Tatro, 468 F.3d at 891, 895. 
 225. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 998. 
 226. Id. at 1000. 
 227. Id. at 997-98. 
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Furthermore, the Court rejected the District’s proposal of a multi-factor 
test to determine: “[1] whether the care is continuous or intermittent, [2] 
whether existing school health personnel can provide the service, [3] the cost 
of the service, and [4] the potential consequences if the service is not properly 
performed.”228  In refusing to apply this test, the Court merely rebutted that the 
District’s analysis “was not supported by any recognized source of legal 
authority.”229  Although the Court’s definition of “medical services” cannot be 
found in the text of the IDEA, it criticized the District’s four-pronged test as 
unsubstantiated.230  While the Court does not elaborate on what makes one 
service more “medical” than another, other than the profession of the health-
care provider, the Court asserted that the District presented no explanation as 
to the characteristics that make health-related services more or less 
“medical.”231 
The District further contended that the financial burden, exceeding 
$30,000, should be a sufficient reason to qualify Garret’s services as an 
exemption.232  The Court noted that Congress’ definition of “related services” 
does not include cost as an enumerated factor when determining the services a 
school district is required to provide under the IDEA.233  However, the Court 
acknowledged that “the IDEA requires schools to hire specially trained 
personnel to meet disabled student needs.”234  The District declared that the 
existing staff was insufficient to attend to other responsibilities while 
simultaneously making a commitment to Garret on a one-on-one basis.235  
Thus, the District argued that hiring new, specially trained personnel inherently 
increased its financial burden.236  As resolved by the Court, however, even if 
continuous services like Garret demanded created an increase in cost and 
required additional personnel, such particulars have no apparent relationship to 
“related services.”237 
Although the Court recognized the District’s concerns as legitimate, it 
concentrated on analyzing the interpretation of existing statutory and common 
law.238  In reference to the ALJ, the Court agreed that the necessary care to 
support Garret’s ventilator dependency does not require the training and 
 
 228. Id. at 998 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 11). 
 229. Id. at 998. 
 230. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 998. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 999; Osborne, supra note 173, at 1. 
 233. Garret, 119 S.Ct. at 999. 
 234. Id. at 998 n.8 (referring to Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 893 (1984)). 
 235. Id. at 999. 
 236. Id. at 998. 
 237. Id. at 998. 
 238. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 999. 
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knowledge of a physician.239  Reiterating its decision in Tatro, the Court 
concluded that “a rule that limits the medical services exemption to physician 
services is unquestionably . . . reasonable and generally workable.”240 
The majority opinion focused on “school health services” as an essential 
component of a school district’s capacity to enhance the education of students 
with special needs.241  It discounted the level or quantity of services provided, 
even when continuous or cumbersome, so long as the services were not 
provided by a qualified physician.242  The Court emphasized that the intent of 
Congress is to provide students with handicaps the opportunity to a “free 
appropriate public education” and “related services.”243  This conclusion, 
however, unreasonably extends congressional intent and concludes that the 
availability of “related services” is indispensable to ensure that students like 
Garret are integrated into the public school system.244 
IV. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, and formulated 
several important arguments against the majority view.  First, the dissent 
asserted that the majority incorrectly relied on the Tatro ruling that public 
schools are required to provide “school nursing services” as a component of 
“related services,” but not “medical services” provided by a physician.245  
Second, the dissent stated that the majority’s conclusion is contrary to the text 
of the IDEA and moreover, that it improperly relied on the Department of 
Education’s regulations.246  The dissent criticized the majority opinion for 
adhering to and extending Tatro, without regard to the constitutional rules of 
construction that are applicable to the IDEA.247  Third, the dissent determined 
that the majority violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution because 
states are now burdened with broad and expensive health care services beyond 
those anticipated.248 
In support of its first argument, the dissent declared that the Court wrongly 
focused on the provider of the services, instead of the nature of the services 
themselves.249  The dissent stated that “[t]he term ‘medical’ similarly does not 
 
 239. Id. at 996. 
 240. Id. at 998. 
 241. Id. at 997, 1000. 
 242. Id. at 997-98. 
 243. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-01 
(1982) (emphasis added). 
 244. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 999-1000. 
 245. Id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 249. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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support Tatro’s provider-specific approach, but encompasses services that are 
‘of, relating to, or concerned with physicians or the practice of medicine.’”250  
The dissent criticized the majority for failing to explain “why ‘services’ that 
are ‘medical’ in nature are not ‘medical services.’”251  By analogy, the dissent 
showed that automotive services are not limited to those performed by a 
mechanic, but include repair services no matter who performs the work.252  
Thus, the integral daily preventive health care services required by the IDEA 
for special education students fundamentally relates to “medical services.” 
Interpreting the IDEA in a practical manner, the dissent recognized that the 
“Department of Education regulations require districts to provide disabled 
children with health-related services that school nurses can perform as part of 
their normal duties.”253  A school nurse typically renders health services to 
many students throughout the day and is not responsible for one child only.  
While school nurses may provide more services to some students than to 
others, one-on-one supervision as a “private duty” is not within the normal 
duties of a school nurse.254 
In respect to its second argument, the dissent concluded that the intent of 
Congress is pivotal to rendering a proper decision.255  Congressional intent is 
revealed in the IDEA itself and the majority’s analysis should have been 
complete simply by looking at the “related services” provision of the statute.256  
Congress explicitly defined “related services” in the statute and intentionally 
left out specific phrases and provisions.257  Moreover, a “provider-based” 
determination is not expressed in the “related services” definition or the 
“medical services” exclusion.258  In sum, the dissenters argued that the 
majority failed to consider this inquiry and that it inappropriately deferred to 
the Department of Education’s regulations.259 
If Congress intended to distinguish “medical services” in such a manner as 
to exclude those services provided by a physician, it would have done so.  
Prior to Tatro, the proposed regulations by the Secretary of Education 
 
 250. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INT’L DICTIONARY 1402 (1986)). 
 251. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.J. 1996) (noting 
that the school board is not required to furnish “services of a full-time attendant to monitor [the 
plaintiff’s] tracheostomy tube and provide suctioning when needed. . . [;][t]hose are medical 
services which the IDEA does not require a local school board to provide”). 
 255. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 256. Id. at 1001. 
 257. Id. at 1000 n.1 (identifying “related services” as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) 
(1994)). 
 258. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). 
 259. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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excluded medical services, defined as “services relating to the practice of 
medicine.”260  Although the proposed regulations were never adopted,261 it is 
important to recognize that the proposed definition did not envision a 
“physician-based” rule.  The dissent criticized the majority for erroneously 
relying on its previous decision in Tatro, in which the Supreme Court held that 
current regulations meant to exclude those services provided by a licensed 
physician.262  According to the dissent, the Garret majority did not rely on the 
regulation itself and any deference to a statute that does not exist is 
impermissible.263 
The dissent referred to other legislation that defines “[t]he term ‘medical 
services’ [to] include[], in addition to medical examination, treatment[,] and 
rehabilitative services[,] . . . preventive health services.”264  The purpose of the 
IDEA is “to increase the educational opportunities available to disabled 
children, not to provide medical care for them.”265  To hold states accountable 
for access to a wide range of health services in schools, the dissenters argued, 
is to expand the IDEA and the intent of Congress beyond rational and 
reasonable expectation.266 
In its final argument, the dissent contended that the term “related services” 
should be construed narrowly and unambiguously so as not to burden school 
districts with unexpected fiscal obligations.267  While drafting the IDEA, 
Congress limited the state’s financial burdens by only requiring the 
opportunity for an appropriate level of education, not a maximum level of 
education.268  In addition, the Department of Education’s regulations provide 
that children with disabilities should be afforded those services that are part of 
the school nurse’s normal responsibilities.269  School districts are not obligated 
 
 260. Id. (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 3383[6] (1982)). 
 261. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 262. Id. at 1001-02. 
 263. Id. at 1002. 
 264. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 38 U.S.C § 1701(6)); see 
also 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (1994).  “The term ‘medical care’ means amounts paid—for the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any 
structure of function of the body.”  Id. 
 265. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 266. Id. at 1002-03. 
 267. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. And Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)); see also Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17 (1981); see also Board of 
Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982); see 
generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).  “[I]f Congress desires to condition 
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New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (spending power of Congress is subject to 
distribution restrictions). 
 268. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 269. Id. at 1003. 
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to hire additional personnel to provide expensive and onerous care for students 
with disabilities.270  This argument is consistent with the Court’s obligation to 
interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly.271 
Because the IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, it is 
limited in its application and by its construction.272  The majority’s holding that 
the extent and nature of the services is irrelevant to the relationship to “medical 
services” contradicts the “rules of construction principles that are applicable to 
Spending Clause legislation.”273  The dissent asserted that extending school 
nursing services to a continuous one-on-one basis imposes extraordinary and 
demanding obligations on school districts to absorb the financial encumbrances 
for unexpected health related services.274  Such an imposition construes the 
IDEA in too broad a fashion.275 
In conclusion, the dissent demanded a limited interpretation of the IDEA to 
prevent surprising economic burdens and excessive responsibilities beyond the 
scope of reasonable anticipation.276  The IDEA was implemented to enhance 
the educational opportunity for special needs children, not to institutionalize 
medical services into the student’s curriculum or into the school district’s 
operation.277  Hence, integrating students with handicaps into the public school 
system is to be done in accordance with Spending Clause legislation and 
Congressional intent when it is feasible and appropriate.278 
ANALYSIS 
The fundamental principle of the IDEA is to provide students with 
disabilities the opportunity for “meaningful access” to special education in the 
public school system when appropriate.279  The operative term in the 
expression “free appropriate public education” is the word “appropriate.”  
Limiting the determination of whether health services are appropriate to a 
“provider-based” distinction disregards the intent of Congress and the 
underlying purpose of the IDEA.280 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 1002. “The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending 
power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
‘contract.’  There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions 
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”  Id.  (citing Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17). 
 273. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 203 and 
accompanying text. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See supra notes 267 and 274 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 278. Garret, 119 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 279. See supra notes 78 and 83 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 128-30, 136, 147, 154-55 and 203 and accompanying text. 
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In Garret, the plaintiff was severely disabled and required vigilant nursing 
services at all times, not merely a series of effortless and infrequent 
examinations, like in Tatro.281  The Court inappropriately held that the services 
Garret required were “related services,” even though they were medical in 
nature.282  The Court encumbered the District with unexpected financial 
obligations and the delivery of continuous medically related health services 
based solely on the profession of Garret’s provider.283  Moreover, the Garret 
majority failed to distinguish ancillary educational services from intense 
medical interventions.284  Garret did not consider the risk or the plausible 
consequences in case of an accident or the potential liability of the District. 
Congress intended to identify and educate children with disabilities, but 
did not expect school districts to supplement education with extreme medical 
care or provide them every educational opportunity.285  Although unfavorable, 
homebound instruction arguably may provide more educational benefits than 
public schooling and may be more appropriate for students with extreme 
debilitating conditions.286  Structuring an IEP for private education to include 
social, educational and vocational elements will enable a child with disabilities 
to learn and succeed in a more stable environment while simultaneously 
meeting their unique and individualized needs.  Public education with students 
without disabilities may enhance social development and aptitude, but 
classroom instruction should only be afforded to children with disabilities 
when it is practical, economic and safe. 
Hiring and training competent personnel to provide full-time nursing 
services to a dependent student burdens a school district with economic and 
accountability concerns.287  In addition, the risk of a traumatic or fatal accident 
is presumably greater for students suffering from severe disabilities who 
require continuous medical attention.  The extent and nature of the care 
provided will establish if the health care services must be delivered 
continuously and intensely as the “private duty” of a school nurse.288 
Health services are deemed appropriate when they are “related services” 
and are provided by a school nurse or other qualified individual.  “Medical 
services” are included in the definition of “related services,” so long as they 
are not provided beyond diagnostic or evaluative purposes.289  Although the 
IDEA makes no reference to a “provider-based” distinction regarding “medical 
 
 281. See supra notes 180 and 197 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 225-37 and 251 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 222, 238 and 240-41 and accompanying text. 
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services,” the Tatro Court improperly concluded that the difference between 
“medical services” and “related services” is that a physician provides the 
former, while the latter is provided by anyone other than a physician.  Thus, 
services that are provided by a school nurse are included “related services,” but 
if a physician performs the exact same services, then they are excluded 
“medical services.”  It is illogical to say that a medically related disability 
requiring constant health services includes “related services,” but does not 
integrate “medical services” because of the profession of the provider.290 
The definition of “medical services” in other legislation is written to 
include treatment, rehabilitation and preventative health services.291  Again, 
there is no distinction based on the status of the provider.  Although the IDEA 
did not explicitly define “medical services” to include the aforementioned 
services, the term “related services” does consist of these types of services as 
well as “medical services.”  While Congress did not specifically define 
“medical services,” it is not evident from the IDEA that Congress intended or 
even considered that services provided by a physician should be excluded as 
“medical services.” 
School nurses provide extensive and intense health care services to 
children with disabilities, treatment in critical situations and rehabilitative and 
preventative health services to reduce and evade unfavorable health conditions.  
Thus, as an inherent responsibility of the profession, nurses provide medical 
services.  These medical services should be excluded from the burden on 
school districts based on the extent and nature of the services provided by a 
school nurse to a student with severe disabilities.292  It is unreasonable to limit 
the provision of health care services beyond evaluative or diagnostic purposes 
to a “physician-based” rule.293 
The purpose of excluding “medical services” is to reduce the burden on 
school districts from providing complex “school health services.”294  However, 
simplistic “related services” can become extraordinarily complicated when 
problems arise for students with disabilities who require full-time nursing 
services.  To maintain the spirit of the IDEA, it is more reasonable and fair to 
exclude burdensome nursing services that demand extensive health care and 
attention and that are more analogous to “medical services” than “related 
services.”295 
 
 290. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 291. 38 U.S.C. § 1701(8) (1994). Rehabilitative services means services “necessary to 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garret imposes upon school districts the 
responsibility of staffing specialized personal attendants for students with 
handicaps who cannot perform the daily functions of life without habitual 
supervision and assistance.  Because of this onerous responsibility, it is 
conceivable that schools will be compelled to have immediate access to 
emergency care facilities in case of a crisis situation where expert services 
would be essential.  The potential irreparable harm to a susceptible student 
with disabilities because of incompetent personnel or insufficient training also 
substantially increases the liability of a school district.296 
The risk, obligation and liability of a school district should be balanced 
with the opportunity for “meaningful access” to a “free appropriate public 
education” for students with disabilities.  Basing the distinction of “medical 
services” and “related services” on the title and education of the provider is 
simply inadequate and fails to define the “medical services” expression.297  It is 
difficult to comprehend how medically related health services, which appear 
medical in nature, are not considered “medical services.”  Limiting health 
services to students with handicaps via a “provider-based” rule is unwarranted 
and should not be the deciding factor of the services that are provided. 
The IDEA does not require school districts to provide an equal opportunity 
to public education for special needs students.298  Although schools and 
teachers educate children to become productive citizens and future leaders in 
society, they are not in the business of providing private health services to 
children with extensive handicaps.299  It is not suggested that students with 
disabilities do not deserve an education or that they cannot be productive 
citizens and/or future leaders.  This Note plausibly advocates that the statutory 
interpretation of the IDEA does not require the maximum educational 
opportunity, but rather an appropriate education that considers the extent and 
nature of the health related services before requiring intense, comprehensive 
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